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A pairing-friendly hyperelliptic curve over a finite field Fq is one whose
group of Fq-rational points of its Jacobian has size divisible by a large prime
and whose embedding degree is small enough for computations to be feasible
but large enough for the discrete logarithm problem in the embedding field to
be difficult. We give a sequence of Fq-isogeny classes for a family of Jacobians of
curves of genus 2 over Fq, for q = 2m, and their corresponding small embedding
degrees for the subgroup with large prime order. We give examples of the
parameters for such curves with embedding degree k < (log q)2, such as k =
8, 13, 16, 23, 26, 37, 46, 52. For secure and efficient implementation of pairing-
based cryptography on curves of genus g over Fq, it is desirable that the ratio
ρ = g log2 q
log2 `
be approximately 1, where ` is the order of the subgroup with
embedding degree k. We show that for our family of curves, ρ is often near 1
and never more than 2.
vi
We construct examples to show that the minimal embedding field can
be significantly smaller than Fqk . This has the implication that attacks on
the DLP can be dramatically faster than expected, so there could be “pairing-
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The security of public-key cryptosystems, which were introduced by Diffie and
Hellman in [DH76], is based on the computational difficulty of solving the
discrete logarithm problem.
Definition 1.0.1. The discrete logarithm problem (DLP) is as follows: given
a finite cyclic group G generated by g and an element h ∈< g >, find an
integer α such that h = gα.
Discrete logarithm (DL) cryptosystems were concentrating on the mul-
tiplicative group of a finite field, but then in 1985, Koblitz [Kob87] and Miller
[Mil86] independently proposed using the group of rational points on an ellip-
tic curve on which to base a DL cryptosystem. Elliptic curves are attractive
for cryptography as there is currently no sub-exponential algorithm for solving
the discrete logarithm problem on properly chosen curves.
The National Security Agency states in [Age05], “Elliptic Curve Cryp-
tography provides greater security and more efficient performance than the
first generation public key techniques (RSA and Diffie-Hellman) now in use.”
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Koblitz also proposed using Jacobian varieties of hyperelliptic curves over fi-
nite fields to supply the group of prime order [Kob89]. With hyperelliptic
curves of small genus, it is possible to work over a smaller field while achieving
comparable security as in other cryptosystems.
Definition 1.0.2. The hyperelliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (HCDLP)
is the following: Let C be a hyperelliptic curve over a finite field Fq. Suppose
P is some point of JC(Fq) with large prime order and let Q be a point in
< P >. Find an integer α such that Q = [α]P .
Bilinear maps on certain groups used in DL cryptosystems were first
used to attack cryptographic security in 1993 with the work of Menezes,
Okamoto and Vanstone [MOV93]. The MOV attack used the Weil pairing on
supersingular elliptic curves to transport the discrete logarithm problem on
a curve defined over Fq to the discrete logarithm in the multiplicative group
of a finite field Fqk , for some k, where there are more efficient methods for
solving the DLP. In 1994, Frey and Rück [FR94] used the Tate pairing in a
similar attack, and so pairings were viewed as useful for destructive purposes
in cryptography.
In 2000, positive applications of bilinear maps were proposed indepen-
dently in [Jou00] and [SOK00], and since then pairings on groups have been
used for many constructive purposes. A few examples include a one-round
three-party key agreement [Jou00] (see also [Jou04]), identity-based encryp-
tion (IBE) [BF01], and short signatures [BLS01] (see also [BLS04]).
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The exponent k has become known as the embedding degree. For an
`-order subgroup of the Jacobian of a curve defined over Fq, k is the smallest
positive integer such that qk− 1 is divisible by `. For pairing-based cryptosys-
tems, it is important to find curves where the embedding degree k is small
enough that the pairing is efficiently computable, but large enough that the
DLP in the embedding field is difficult. The common practice is to consider
k/g for assessment of cryptographic security. However, this may fail to capture
the security of a pairing-based cryptosystem ([Gal01a, Section 3.11],[RS02],
[Sil03]). We will construct examples that show how the embedding degree can
be a far from accurate measure of the size of the minimal embedding field.
We know that k ≤ 6 for supersingular elliptic curves, as first shown in
[MOV93]. Galbraith in [Gal01b] shows that k ≤ 12 for supersingular curves
of genus two, which is attained in characteristic two. It has also been shown
in [GMV04] that one can obtain k = 12 for ordinary curves of genus two in
characteristic two. In general, one expects k to be roughly the size of the large
prime-order subgroup, and for cryptographic applications such a k would be
much too large for the computation of pairings to be feasible.
It is also desirable for the order of JC(Fq) to be prime or near-prime,
since the attack of [PH78] can reduce the DLP to prime-order subgroups. Thus
for a curve of genus g and embedding degree k with respect to a subgroup of
prime order `, one examines the ratio ρ = g log2 q
log2 `
. For secure and efficient
implementation, the ideal situation is to have ρ ∼ 1, though currently the
best ratio achieved is ρ ∼ 5/4 [BW05].
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Following [GM05], we will say that a pairing-friendly curve C over Fq
is one that satisfies the following two conditions: (1) #JC(Fq) should be divis-
ible by a “sufficiently large” prime ` so that the DLP in the `-order subgroup
of JC(Fq) is suitably hard, and (2) the embedding degree k should be “suf-
ficiently small” so that the arithmetic in Fqk can be efficiently implemented,
but large enough so that the DLP in the finite field withstands index-calculus
attacks. We refrain from making precise these sizes at this point. Much re-
search has focused on understanding and constructing suitable supersingular
and ordinary hyperelliptic curves. We will produce parameters for a family
of non-supersingular, non-ordinary curves of genus two with small embedding
degree for the large prime-order subgroup of the Jacobian defined over Fq.
Our discussion is as follows. In Chapter 2 we present the mathematical
framework underlying the results of this work. Then in Chapter 3 we give
our pairing-friendly curves: a sequence of Fq-isogeny classes for a family of
Jacobians of genus 2 curves over Fq, for q = 2m, and the corresponding small
embedding degrees for the large prime order subgroup. We give examples of
the parameters for such curves with embedding degree k < (log q)2, such as
k = 8, 13, 16, 23, 26, 37, 46, 52. (Whenever we use log x, we mean the natural
logarithm of x.) We show that for our family of curves, the ratio ρ is often
near 1 and never more than 2.
In Chapter 4 we discuss why the embedding degree of a curve may
not necessarily correspond to the minimal embedding field, and we construct
examples to show that the difference in size of the extension degrees can be
significant. For a curve of any genus defined over Fq, where q = pm, the
4
pairing on a group of order ` embeds in a field that is not necessarily an
extension of Fq, but merely of Fp. This was noted to yield a difference in field
exponents by a factor of 2 in the supersingular case when ` is sufficiently large
in [RS02]. More specifically, if ord`p is the smallest positive integer x such
that px ≡ 1 mod `, then the minimal embedding field is Fpord`p = FpkD , where
D = gcd(ord`p, m). Our examples demonstrate that there can be a difference
for both supersingular and non-supersingular curves and that it can grow with
m. As in [RS02] and [Sil03], we advocate the use of two separate parameters:
an embedding degree to indicate the field one must work over to compute the
pairing, and a security parameter such as k′ = ord`p
mg





2.1 Curves and Jacobians
We provide the mathematical framework for hyperelliptic curves in cryptog-
raphy as it pertains to our research. For a more thorough treatment, refer
to [CF05, Chapters 4,6,14]. For a prime p and positive integer m, we let Fq
be a finite field with q = pm elements. The characteristic of Fq is p, and the
extension degree is m. We will also write F∗q ≡ Fq − {0}. For any field k, we
let k be an algebraic closure of k.
Definition 2.1.1. [JMS04] Let g > 0 be an integer. A non-singular (imaginary
quadratic) hyperelliptic curve C of genus g over a field k is defined by an
equation of the form
C : y2 + h(x)y = f(x),
where h, f ∈ k[x], f is monic, deg(f) = 2g+1, deg(h) ≤ g, and if y2+h(u)v =
f(u) for (u, v) ∈ k × k, then 2v + h(u) 6= 0 or h′(u)v − f ′(u) 6= 0. In the case
when g = 1 we call C an elliptic curve.
If the characteristic is not equal to two, then we can assume without
loss of generality that h(x) = 0.
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Definition 2.1.2. [JMS04] For any subfield K of k containing the field k, the
set
C(K) = {(x, y) : x, y ∈ K, y2 + h(x)y = f(x)} ∪ {∞}
is called the set of K-rational points on C. The point ∞ is called the point at
infinity and corresponds to the only projective point at infinity that satisfies
the homogenized equation. A point P on C, written P ∈ C, is a point P ∈
C(k).
The K-rational points of an elliptic curve form a group, but this is
not the case for hyperelliptic curves of genus g ≥ 2, so one uses the group of
k-rational points of the Jacobian of C. In this paper, whenever we refer to a
curve as if it is a group, we mean the group Fq-rational points of the Jacobian
of the curve.
Let us review a few concepts needed to understand the construction of
the Jacobian. We let K be a perfect field and GK denote the absolute Galois
group of K.
Definition 2.1.3. [CF05, Section 14.1.2] The group of divisors of C over K
of degree 0 is given by
Div0C(K) = {D =
∑
P∈C




and such that σ(D) =
∑
P∈C
nP σ(P ) = D for all σ ∈ GK}.
The latter condition means that the divisor is defined over K, and the
condition that
∑
P∈C nP = 0 means the divisor has degree 0.
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The function field of C over K, K(C), is the field of fractions of the
coordinate ring, K[C] = K[x, y]/(y2+h(x)y−f(x)). For a function f ∈ K(C),
f 6= 0, let ordP (f) count the multiplicity of f at P , where ordP (f) > 0 if P is
a zero of f , and ordP (f) < 0 if f has a pole at P . We can build a degree zero
divisor defined over K as div(f) =
∑
P∈C ordP (f)(P ). Any divisor D = div(f)
will be called a principal divisor.
Definition 2.1.4. The divisor class group of C over K, denoted by Pic0C(K),
is the quotient group of Div0C(K) by the group of principal divisors of C over
K.
Hence, two divisors D and D′ belong to the same equivalence class when
their difference D −D′ is a principal divisor. There exists an abelian variety
which can be defined over K, called the Jacobian of C, JC , of dimension g
such that JC(K) is isomorphic to Pic
0
C(K) for all K.
Definition 2.1.5. If ` is an integer, then JC(K)[`] denotes the set of all `-
torsion points of JC(K), i.e. all points P over K such that [`]P = O.
Definition 2.1.6. Let p > 0 be the characteristic of the field K.
(i) An abelian variety A is said to have p-rank s if the subgroup of points
of order p of A(K) has cardinality ps, that is, A(K)[p] ' (Z/pZ)s. By
the p-rank of a curve we mean the p-rank of its Jacobian variety.
(ii) An abelian variety of dimension g is said to be ordinary if it has p-rank
g.
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(iii) An elliptic curve is supersingular if it has p-rank 0, and a general abelian
variety is supersingular if it is isogenous over K to a product of supersin-
gular elliptic curves [Oor74]. While every supersingular abelian variety
has p-rank 0, the converse is only true for abelian varieties of dimension
less than 2 [CF05, Remark 4.75].
The Jacobian of C defined over Fq has an endomorphism called the
Frobenius endomorphism, which sends a point (x, y) to (xq, yq). If the Jaco-
bian has dimension g, then the Frobenius endomorphism satisfies an integer
polynomial P (x) of degree 2g, and it is known as the characteristic poly-
nomial of Frobenius. If L(t) is the numerator of the zeta function of the
curve, then P (x) = x2gL(1/x), and P (x) factors over the complex numbers
as P (x) =
∏2g
i=1(x − αi), where |αi| =
√
q. This characteristic polynomial of
Frobenius determines the Fq-isogeny class of the abelian variety [Tat66].
Let C be a smooth projective curve of genus g over Fq. Then for any
integer r ≥ 1, we have










q − 1)2g ≤ #JC(Fq) ≤ (
√
q + 1)2g.
In particular, for g = 2 there exist integers a1, a2 such that
#C(Fq) = a1 + q + 1, and #C(Fq2) = 2a2 − a21 + q2 + 1,
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The characteristic polynomial of Frobenius is
fJC (t) = t
4 + a1t
2 + a2t
2 + qa1t + q
2,
where the a1 and a2 determine the Fq-isogeny class of JC , and
#JC(Fq) = 1 + a1 + a2 + qa1 + q2.
2.2 Pairings
It was first observed by Menezes, Okamoto, and Vanstone in [MOV93] that one
may be able to reduce the discrete logarithm problem on a curve defined over
Fq to the discrete logarithm in the multiplicative group of a finite field, Fqk
for some k, by means of a pairing on the curve. The DLP in F∗
qk
is amenable
to more efficient techniques, such as index calculus methods, thus potentially
rendering the curves less secure. The original MOV attack used the Weil
pairing, which we do not define here, but as Frey and Rück show in [FR94],
one could equally well use the Tate pairing to provide the necessary bilinear
non-degenerate map. Since the Tate pairing is less costly from a computational
point of view, so we will focus on its use (see Definition 2.2.1).
The reduction procedure is commonly referred to as the MOV attack or
Frey-Rück attack, and it works as follows. Let C be a hyperelliptic curve over
Fq and e be a suitable pairing. Let P ∈ JC(Fqk) of order n and Q ∈< P >.
We wish to find an integer α such that Q = αP . We find some point R ∈
JC(Fqk)[n] such that g = e(P, R) has order n, and compute h = e(Q,R). Since
e is non-degenerate, h has order n, and since e is bilinear, we have h = gα.
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Thus the DLP on the curve has been reduced to a DLP in the multiplicative
group of a finite field.
Now, when given a divisor D =
∑
P∈C nP P of degree zero and a func-
tion f ∈ Fq(C) such that D and div(f) have disjoint support, we define
f(D) =
∏
P∈C,nP 6=0 f(P )
nP .
Definition 2.2.1. Let ` > 0 be an integer prime to q, and let k ∈ Z be
minimal with ` | (qk − 1). The Tate pairing is a bilinear map




defined in the following way [CF05, Section 16.1.1]: Take P ∈ JC(Fqk)[`] and
Q ∈ JC(Fqk). Represent P by a divisor DP of degree 0 defined over Fqk , and
let fP be a function on C with div(fP ) = `(DP ). Represent Q by a divisor
DQ of degree 0 defined over Fqk such that DQ and DP have disjoint support.
(One can show that in every divisor class there is a divisor DQ with support
disjoint to DP , as in [MOV93] and [FMR99].) Then




The Tate pairing is usually not symmetric. If ` | q − 1 then it is non-
degenerate in the sense that for any given P ∈ JC(Fqk)[`] not equal to O,
we can always find a Q ∈ JC(Fqk) such that T`(P, Q) 6= 1. Instead of taking
values of the pairing as classes modulo `-th powers, one usually gets a unique
representation by considering the reduced pairing
T (P, Q) = fP (DQ)
(qk−1)/` ∈ µ` ⊂ F∗qk .
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2.3 Embedding degree and security
Since it is possible to embed a subgroup of JC(Fq) into F∗qk , the parameter k has
become known as the embedding degree and has been viewed as an indicator
of the security of the curve.
Definition 2.3.1. A subgroup of JC(Fq) with order ` has embedding degree k
with respect to ` if k is the smallest integer such that ` | qk − 1.
We see that the embedding degree may be viewed as k = ord`q, where
ord`q is defined according to the following definition.
Definition 2.3.2. Let p be a positive integer and ` be a prime, ` - p. The
smallest positive integer x such that px ≡ 1 mod ` is called the order of p
modulo `, denoted by ord`p.
In Chapter 4, we will present examples to show why the embedding
degree can be an inaccurate indicator of security, as the pairing can embed
into a significantly smaller field than the one suggested by k. The embedding
degree k has utility as it indicates the field one must work over to compute
the pairing, which needs to be small enough for computations to be efficient.
Meanwhile, in security analysis, one would like to compare the difficulty of
solving the DLP in the minimal embedding field with solving the DLP on the
curve, as both should be computationally intractable [CF05, Section 24.2.2].
Galbraith in [Gal01b] suggests k/g should be considered for security, as this
represents the logarithmic ratio between the size of the finite field Fqk and the
size of JC(Fq). We follow a terminology ([Sil03]) compatible with [RS02]:
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Definition 2.3.3. The security parameter with respect to an `-order subgroup
of a curve of genus g over a finite field Fpm is k′ = ord`pmg .
We note that for cryptographic security one needs the size of the min-
imal embedding field to be of approximately 1024 bits to avoid index calculus
computations, and the prime ` should be approximately 160 bits so that the
DLP on the curve is suitably hard [CF05, Section 24.2.1c]. Thus, the security




A Family of Curves
We now consider curves of genus two over Fq, where q = 2m, and whose asso-
ciated Jacobian is 2-rank 1, neither supersingular, nor ordinary. [LS05] gives
formulas for fast arithmetic on genus two curves over binary fields, and [Bir06]
gives them for 2-rank 1 curves, which suggests such curves are interesting to
consider for cryptosystems.
The fact that there exist simple abelian surfaces with characteristic
polynomial of Frobenius f(t) = t4 + a1t
3 + a2t
2 + qa1t + q
2 ∈ Z[t] for certain
conditions on a1 and a2 is shown in [Rüc90], but that there exists a Jacobian of
a curve defined over Fq with such a characteristic polynomial is due to [MN02].
So we have that (a1, a2) determines the Fq-isogeny class of the Jacobian of a
smooth projective curve C of genus two defined over Fq, with #JC(Fq) =
q2 + a1q + a2 + a1 + 1.
We let C be a curve of genus two over Fq of the form
y2 + xy = x5 + bx3 + cx2 + dx
where b, c, d ∈ F∗q, and with characteristic polynomial of Frobenius f(t) =
t4 + a1t
3 + a2t
2 + qa1t + q
2 ∈ Z[t]. Our approach is as follows. In Section 3.1,
14





r ≥ 0 and odd L ≥ 9, and we determine the embedding degrees for subgroups
having these orders when they are prime. In Section 3.2, we associate with
each of these primes a sequence of genus two curves over Fq, whose group of
Fq-rational points of its Jacobian has order that is divisible by the prime Nr,L.
For example, for each m in the interval d2r+1L
3
e ≤ m ≤ 2r(L − 1) − 1, we get
#JC(Fq) = 2x(22
r
+1)Nr,L, where x = 2m−2rL. We describe the curves by the
Fq-isogeny class of their Jacobians, such as having a1 = −1, and a2 = 2m + 2x
in the case mentioned above. We show that for our family of curves the
ratio ρ is often near 1 and is never more than 2, which suggests efficient
implementation would be possible. We give examples of the parameters for
such curves with embedding degree k = 8, 13, 16, 23, 26, 37, 46, 52. In Section
3.3, we show that the embedding degree k is always “small,” that is, k <
(log q)2, so that computations in Fqk may be feasible.
3.1 Family of primes and their embedding degrees




is a prime1 for some r ≥ 0 and odd L ≥ 5. We
have seen experimentally that for r = 0, 2, 3, Nr,L is very often prime. These
primes are of the form A
L+1
A+1
where L is prime and A is a positive integer; if the
behavior follows that of the primes A
L−1
A−1 and there is no algebraic factorization,
then we would expect there to be infinitely many such primes, and that the
number of such primes with L ≤ N is asymptotic to log log N
log A
for fixed A [Cal06].
1Nr,L = 22
r(L−1) − 22r(L−2) + 22r(L−3) − 22r(L−4) + · · · − 2 + 1, so clearly Nr,L ∈ Z for
r ≥ 0 and odd L ≥ 5.
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Experimental evidence seems to confirm this for r = 0, 2, 3.
Our families of curves will be those whose Jacobian is such that its
group of Fq-rational points has order divisible by Nr,L, and whose (a1, a2)
have a specific description to be explicitly given later.
We must first prove several lemmas that will enable us to achieve our
main result. We begin by noting that r = 1 never yields a prime.
Lemma 3.1.1. Let L ≥ 5 be odd. N1,L = 2
2L+1
22+1
is not a prime.
Proof. Let P = 2
L+1
2+1
= N0,L. We see that 9P
2 = 22L + 2L+1 + 1. So N1,L =
9P 2−2L+1
22+1

















) ∈ Z. Since 3P + 2L+12 = 2L + 1 + 2L+12
equals 5 only if L = 1 and 3P − 2L+12 = 2L + 1− 2L+12 equals 5 only if L = 3,
then this is a nontrivial factorization when L ≥ 5. Thus, N1,L is not prime for
L ≥ 5.
We now determine the embedding degree for a general prime N over
Fq.
Lemma 3.1.2. Let q = pm for some prime p and positive integer m, N
be a prime not equal to p, and k be the smallest positive integer such that






Proof. Let D = gcd(ordNp, m). We observe that
1 ≡ pordNp ≡ (pordNp)m/D ≡ (pm)ordNp/D mod N,
so since q = pm and k is the smallest integer such that qk ≡ 1 mod N , then
we have k | ordNp
D
.








) = 1, therefore it must be that ordNp
D
| k. Thus we have k = ordNp
D
and the proof is complete.
Motivated by this understanding of k, we determine ordNr,L2 via the
following lemmas.






Proof. We first note that if A = ab for positive integers a, b where b is odd,
then xa + 1 | xA + 1 for any integer x. To see this:
xA + 1 = xab + 1 = (xa + 1)(xa(b−1) − xa(b−2) + xa(b−3) − · · ·+ 1).
Thus xa + 1 | xA + 1.
Now, if our odd L is not prime, then L = ab for odd a, b > 1. By
the above argument, 22
r







. But if 2
2rL+1
22r+1
is prime, then it must be that a = L, and hence
L is prime.









Proof. We have (22
r
+1)Nr,L = 2
2rL +1. So 22
rL ≡ −1 mod Nr,L. This implies
22
r+1L ≡ 1 mod Nr,L. So ordNr,L2 | 2r+1L. But by Lemma 3.1.3 we know that
L is prime, so it must be that either ordNr,L2 = 2
j or ordNr,L2 = 2
jL for some
0 ≤ j ≤ r + 1.
Suppose ordNr,L2 = 2
j for some 0 ≤ j ≤ r + 1. Then 22j ≡ 1 mod Nr,L.
So Nr,L | 22
j − 1. This implies Nr,L ≤ 22
j − 1 ≤ 22r+1 − 1. But we know that
Nr,L > 2
2r(L−2) ≥ 22r3 > 22r+1 − 1 for L ≥ 5. Therefore, ordNr,L2 6= 2j for
0 ≤ j ≤ r + 1.
Now suppose ordNr,L2 = 2
jL for some 0 ≤ j ≤ r. Then
22
jL ≡ 1 mod Nr,L ⇒ (22
jL)2
r−j ≡ 1 mod Nr,L
⇒ 22rL ≡ 1 mod Nr,L.
But we know that 22
rL ≡ −1 mod Nr,L. Thus it must be that j = r + 1 and
so ordNr,L2 = 2
r+1L.
We are now able to state the embedding degree k of a group of order
Nr,L, where q = 2
m for a specific range of m. Here we study the traditional
embedding degree k; however, in Chapter 4, we will revisit this understand-
ing and consider a separate security parameter that indicates the minimal
embedding field.




be prime for some r ≥ 0 and odd L ≥ 5,
m ≤ 2r(L − 1) − 1 and also allow m = L+1
2
in the case that r = 0, and let
k be the embedding degree of curve C with respect to Nr,L. Then k = 2
r+1−i
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when gcd(ordNr,L2, m) = 2
iL for i ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1}, and k = 2r+1−iL when
gcd(ordNr,L2, m) = 2
i for i ∈ {0, . . . , r + 1}.
Proof. By Lemma 3.1.4, we know that ordNr,L2 = 2
r+1L. Suppose
gcd(ordNr,L2, m) = 2
iL for 0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1. (Note that i ≤ r − 1 since
gcd(ordNr,L2, m) = 2








Now suppose gcd(ordNr,L2, m) = 2








(Note that since 2
r+1L
2i
∈ Z and L is odd, then i ≤ r + 1.)
We note that the embedding degree k is unbounded as L is unbounded.
We now seek to find curves over Fq associated with Jacobians whose group of
Fq-rational points has order is divisible by Nr,L.
3.2 Genus 2 curves for a given Fq-isogeny class of Jaco-
bians
We know that the (a1, a2) determines the Fq-isogeny class of the Jacobian of a
curve of genus two, and the following theorem is a consequence of [MN02] and
gives the conditions for a curve associated with such a Jacobian to exist. A
converse is also proven in [MN02], but we will not need it for our result. (This
statement combines Lemma 2.1, Theorem 2.9 part (M) and Corollary 2.17 of
[MN02], as it appears in [MV05].)
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Theorem 3.2.1. Let q = pm for a prime p and positive integer m. There
exists a curve of the form y2 + xy = x5 + bx3 + cx2 + dx, b, c, d ∈ F∗q, with
characteristic polynomial of Frobenius f(t) = t4 + a1t
3 + a2t
2 + qa1t + q
2 if the
following conditions hold:
1. a1 is odd,
2. |a1| ≤ 4
√
q,
3. there exists an integer a2 such that
(a) 2|a1|
√
q − 2q ≤ a2 ≤ a21/4 + 2q,
(b) a2 is divisible by 2
dm/2e,
(c) ∆ = a21 − 4a2 + 8q is not a square in Z,
(d) δ = (a2 + 2q)
2 − 4qa21 is not a square in Z2 (the 2-adic
integers).
We use this theorem to establish the existence of curves of genus two
with specific conditions on (a1, a2). We then show these are the conditions
needed so that #JC(Fq) is divisible by Nr,L.
We first give a lemma that will be used in the proof of the next propo-
sition.
Lemma 3.2.2. If a, b, c are integers, with a, b > 0, and 2a(2b − 1) = c(c + 1)
then a ≤ b.
Proof. Suppose c is even. Then c+1 is odd. So 2a | c, and c = 2ax for some odd
integer x such that |x| ≥ 1, and x(c+1) = 2b−1. Then 2b = x(2ax+1)+1. If
x ≥ 1, then 2b ≥ 2a +2 and so b > a. If x ≤ 1, then 2b = |x|(2a|x|−1)+1 ≥ 2a
and so b ≥ a.
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Now suppose c+1 is even. Then c is odd. So 2a | c+1 and c+1 = 2ax for
some odd integer x such that |x| ≥ 1 and xc = 2b−1. Then 2b = x(2ax−1)+1.
If x ≥ 1, then 2b ≥ 2a, and so b ≥ a. If x ≤ 1, then 2b = |x|(2a|x| + 1) + 1 ≥
2a + 2, and so b > a.
Proposition 3.2.3. Let q = 2m, r ≥ 0 and L ≥ 9 be prime. When m = L+1
2
,
let a1 = 1 and a2 = −2m, and when d2
r+1L
3
e ≤ m ≤ 2r(L− 1)− 1, let a1 = −1
and a2 = 2
m+22m−2
rL. These a1 and a2 satisfy the conditions for the existence
of the curves of genus two in Theorem 3.2.1.
Proof. We first note that since L ≥ 9, then m = L+1
2
≥ 5. Now, clearly a1 is
odd and |a1| ≤ 4
√
q in both cases of the proposition.
Let us show 2|a1|
√
q−2q ≤ a2 ≤ a21/4+2q. The first case (when a1 = 1
and a2 = −q for m = L+12 ), gives 2
√
q− 2q ≤ −q ≤ 1/4 + 2q, which is true for




q − 2q ≤ a2 ≤ 1/4 + 2q
⇐⇒ 2m/2+1 − 2m+1 ≤ 2m + 22m−2rL ≤ 1/4 + 2m+1.
Clearly the first inequality holds. The second inequality holds if 22m−2
rL ≤ 2m,
which holds if m ≤ 2rL. This is true since m ≤ 2r(L− 1)− 1.
Let us show 2dm/2e | a2. Clearly the first case is true: 2dm/2e | −2m.
Now consider the second case:
2dm/2e | 2m + 22m−2rL
⇐⇒ 2m− 2rL ≥ dm/2e
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⇐⇒ b3m/2c ≥ 2rL




Thus the condition holds.
Now we show ∆ = a21 − 4a2 + 8q is not a square in Z. The first case
yields ∆ = 1 + 3 · 2m+2. Suppose ∆ = 1 + 3 · 2m+2 = x2 for some integer x.
Since 1 + 3 · 2m+2 is odd, then x is odd, so let x = 2c + 1 for some integer c.
Then ∆ is a square if and only if 3 · 2m = 2m(22 − 1) = c(c + 1). We apply
Lemma 3.2.2, letting a = m and b = 2. Then ∆ is a square implies m ≤ 2.
Thus ∆ is not a square in Z for m = L+1
2
, since m ≥ 5 for L ≥ 9. The
second case yields ∆ = 22m−2
rL+2(22
rL−m− 1) + 1. For contradiction, suppose
∆ = 22m−2
rL+2(22
rL−m − 1) + 1 = x2 for some integer x. Since ∆ is odd, then
x is odd, so let x = 2c+1 for some integer c. Then ∆ is a square if and only if
22m−2
rL(22
rL−m− 1) = c(c + 1). We apply Lemma 3.2.2, letting a = 2m− 2rL





and so 2m − 2rL > 0. Also b > 0 since m ≤ 2r(L − 1) − 1 implies m ≤ 2rL,
and so 2rL−m > 0. Thus ∆ a square implies 2m− 2rL ≤ 2rL−m, that is,
m ≤ 2r+1L
3
. Since L is prime and L 6= 3, then 2r+1L
3





e. But we know that d2r+1L
3
e ≤ m, so this will not hold,
and hence ∆ is not a square.
Now we show δ = (a2+2q)
2−4qa21 is not a square in the 2-adic integers,
Z2. That is, for δ = 2xb, we must show that either b 6≡ 1 mod 8 or x ≡ 1 mod 2.
The first case yields δ = q2−4q = 2m+2(2m−2−1). So b = 2m−2−1 ≡ −1 mod 8
for m ≥ 5. Therefore δ is not a square in Z2 for m = L+12 , since m ≥ 5 when
22
L ≥ 9.
Now consider the second case:
δ = (2m + 22m−2
rL + 2m+1)2 − 2m+2
= (2m + 22m−2
rL)2 + 2m+2(2m + 22m−2
rL) + 22m+2 − 2m+2








⇒ b = 2m−2(23 + 1) + 22m−2rL−1(2 + 1) + 23m−2r+1L−2 − 1.
For m ≥ 5, we have
b ≡ 22m−2rL−1(3) + 23m−2r+1L−2 − 1 mod 8
≡ 23m−2r+1L−2(22rL−m+13 + 1)− 1 mod 8.
Now, suppose b ≡ 1 mod 8. Then
b + 1 ≡ 23m−2r+1L−2(22rL−m+13 + 1) ≡ 2 mod 8.
Clearly 3m−2r+1L−2 cannot be greater than or equal to 3. Now if 3m−2r+1L−
2 = 2, then we have 4(22
rL−m+13 + 1) ≡ 2 mod 8. But a multiple of 4 cannot
be congruent to 2 modulo 8, so this cannot happen. If 3m − 2r+1L − 2 = 1,
then m = 3+2
r+1L
3
. But L is prime and L 6= 3, so m 6∈ Z, and this cannot
happen as we require an integer m. If 3m − 2r+1L − 2 = 0, then we have
22
rL−m+13 + 1 ≡ 2 mod 8. But an odd number cannot be congruent to 2
modulo 8, so this cannot happen. Thus b 6≡ 1 mod 8, and so δ is not a square
in Z2.
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Therefore all the conditions for the existence of genus 2 curves C over
Fq are satisfied for the given (a1, a2) described in the proposition.
We are now able to state our main result in the following theorem.






be a prime for some r ≥ 0 and odd L ≥ 9.
If r = 0, then for m = L+1
2
there exists a curve C of genus two over F2m with
the property that #JC(F2m) = 2 · 3 · N0,L, and a1 = 1, a2 = −2m. If r ≥ 0,
then for each integer m in the interval d2r+1L
3
e ≤ m ≤ 2r(L − 1) − 1, there
exists a curve C of genus two over F2m with the property that #JC(F2m) =
2x(22
r
+ 1)Nr,L, where x = 2m− 2rL, and a1 = −1, a2 = 2m + 2x.





be a prime for some r ≥ 0 and odd L ≥ 9.
We know by Proposition 3.2.3, that the (a1, a2) stated in the theorem,
with m in the specified range, satisfy the conditions for the existence of a curve
C of genus 2 over F2m . We now examine #JC(Fq), recalling that #JC(Fq) =
q2 + a1q + a2 + a1 + 1.
First we consider when r = 0 and m = L+1
2
. For a1 = 1 and a2 = −2m,
we have
#JC(F2m) = 22m + 2m − 2m + 2 = 22m + 2.
Since m = L+1
2
, we have L = 2m− 1, so
#JC(F2m) = 2L+1 + 2 = 2(2L + 1)





Now we consider when r ≥ 0 is an integer not equal to 1, and d2r+1L
3
e ≤
m ≤ 2r(L− 1)− 1. For a1 = −1 and a2 = 2m + 2x, where x = 2m− 2rL, we
have










Thus the theorem is complete.
Now let #JC(Fq) = hNr,L. For the most efficient implementation of
a pairing-based cryptosystem, we would like the cofactor h to be small, that
is, for the ratio ρ = 2 log2 q
log2 Nr,L
to be approximately 1. For our family of curves,
we see that ρ ∼ m
2r−1(L−1) , which is often near 1 and at most 2. In particular,
when m = L+1
2
, we get ρ ∼ L+1
L−1 . When d
2r+1L
3
e ≤ m ≤ 2r(L− 1)− 1, the ratio
can be as small as ρ ∼ 4L
3(L−1) and at most ρ ∼ 2−
2
2r(L−1) .
Table 3.1 gives some examples of the parameters for curves over Fq
yielding small embedding degrees k = 8, 13, 16, 23, 26, 37, 46, 52. A systematic
way of determining the explicit coefficients of a curve when given the (a1, a2)
parameters that distinguish the Fq-isogeny class of its Jacobian is not yet
established. As such, in Example 3.2.5 we have used brute force with MAGMA
code to generate some examples of these curves over small Fq.
Example 3.2.5. We give examples over small Fq for r = 0. We let g be a
primitive element of Fq.
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L = 11, m = L+1
2
= 6, k = 11, ρ ∼ 6/5,
C : y2 + xy = x5 + g8x3 + g3x2 + gx,
L = 11, m = d2r+1L
3
e = 8, k = 11, ρ ∼ 8/5,
C : y2 + xy = x5 + g7x3 + g7x
L = 11, m = 2r(L− 1)− 1 = 9, k = 22, ρ ∼ 9/5,
C : y2 + xy = x5 + g8x3 + g3x
L = 13, m = L+1
2
= 7, k = 26, ρ ∼ 7/6,
C : y2 + xy = x5 + g92x3 + g7x2 + gx
L = 17, m = L+1
2
= 9, k = 34, ρ ∼ 9/8,
C : y2 + xy = x5 + g103x3 + g5x2 + gx
3.3 Size of the embedding degrees
We examine the size of the embedding degrees of the family of curves from
Theorem 3.2.4. We find that for cryptographic sizes, these curves always yield
embedding degrees such that k < (log q)2, which suggests that the embedding
degree may be small enough so that computations are feasible. (See [BK98]
and [GM05, Section 5.2.1] for discussion of the probability of k in this range.)




be prime for some r ≥ 0 and
odd L ≥ 5, and k be the embedding degree of curve C with respect to Nr,L. If
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k L r m a1 a2 ρ
8 37 2 111 -1 2111 + 274 3/2
8 89 2 267 -1 2267 + 2178 3/2
8 149 2 447 -1 2447 + 2298 3/2
13 13 3 80 -1 280 + 256 5/3
16 13 3 91 -1 291 + 278 2
23 23 2 64 -1 264 + 236 3/2
23 23 2 72 -1 272 + 252 5/3
23 23 2 80 -1 280 + 268 9/5
26 13 3 72 -1 272 + 240 3/2
26 13 3 88 -1 288 + 272 9/5
37 37 2 104 -1 2104 + 260 7/5
37 37 2 112 -1 2112 + 276 3/2
37 37 2 120 -1 2120 + 292 5/3
37 37 2 128 -1 2128 + 2108 9/5
37 37 2 136 -1 2136 + 2124 2
46 23 2 68 -1 268 + 244 3/2
46 23 2 76 -1 276 + 260 7/4
46 23 2 84 -1 284 + 276 2
52 13 3 76 -1 276 + 248 5/3
52 13 3 88 -1 288 + 264 7/4
52 13 3 92 -1 292 + 280 2
Table 3.1: Examples of parameters for families of genus 2 curves over F2m with
small embedding degree k.
L ≥ 11, then for each integer m in the interval d2r+1L
3
e ≤ m ≤ 2r(L− 1)− 1,
k < (log q)2. If L ≥ 15, then when r = 0 and m = L+1
2
, k < (log q)2.
Proof. Let d2r+1L
3
e ≤ m ≤ 2r(L−1)−1. By Lemma 3.1.5, the largest that k can
be is k = 2r+1L, so it suffices to consider this case. Given the acceptable range
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for m, it is enough to show k < (log q)2 for m = d2r+1L
3
e. Now k < (log q)2 if











This holds if L ≥ 10 for r = 0. Since we require L to be odd, we can say that
L ≥ 11 for any r ≥ 0 gives the result.
Now let m = L+1
2
and r = 0. By Lemma 3.1.5, it suffices to consider k = 2L.
Now k < (log q)2 if












(L + 1)2 − 2(L + 1) + 2.










As mentioned in the previous chapters, pairing-based attacks can transport
the discrete logarithm problem in JC(Fq) to the discrete logarithm in the
multiplicative group of a finite field, where there are more efficient methods
for solving the DLP. Such attacks have traditionally been viewed as mapping
the DLP into the smallest extension of Fq that contains the `-th roots of unity,
where ` is the order of a subgroup of JC(Fq); that is, Fq(µ`) = Fqk for some
integer k.
We construct examples to demonstrate that the minimal field contain-
ing the embedding, i.e., the smallest extension of Fp containing the `-th roots
of unity, can be a significantly smaller field than Fqk . This can dramatically
speed up attacks on the DLP and has the implication that there could be
“pairing-friendly” curves that may not be as secure as previously believed.
In [RS02] it is shown that if A is a simple supersingular abelian variety
and ` is sufficiently large (compared to qdim(A)), then the extension degree
can differ by a factor of at most two with that of Fqk . We provide examples
that are not limited to the supersingular case, showing that for curves over
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Fpm of any genus, the extension degrees can differ by as much as a factor of
m. This phenomenon only creates a discrepancy in non-prime fields of small
characteristic.
4.1 Examination of the minimal embedding field
We recall Lemma 3.1.2, which tells us that for a subgroup of JC(Fq) with
prime order `, where ` does not equal to p, k = ord`p
gcd(ord`p,m)
. Since µ` lies in
F∗
pord`p
, it is apparent that the minimal embedding field is not Fqk = Fpkm , but
Fpord`p = FpkD , where D = gcd(ord`p, m). So it is conceivable for Fqk and the
minimal embedding field to have extension degrees that differ by a factor of
















One can potentially make this gap arbitrarily large, simply by increas-
ing the exponent m prime to ord`p. We note that whenever q is prime, there
is no difference between the minimal embedding field and Fqk .
To examine the potential difference between the size of the minimal
field that contains the embedding and Fqk , let q = pm with m 6= 1, and
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let us consider [Fqk : Fpord`p ]. That is, set ∆ = mgcd(ord`p,m) , so the size of ∆
reveals the relative change in field size. We see that ∆ = 1 if and only if
gcd(ord`p, m) = m, which corresponds to k being an accurate indicator of the
minimal embedding field. However, it is not unusual to have gcd(ord`p, m) = 1,
hence ∆ = m, showing k to be the least accurate indicator of the minimal
embedding field.
4.2 Examples
Let us look at some examples of genus one and genus two curves that emphasize
this difference between the size of the minimal embedding field and the field
suggested by the embedding degree k. Since cryptographic applications usually
focus on prime fields and binary fields, and the discrepancy is only visible in
the extension field case, we will give examples in characteristic two.
4.2.1 Elliptic curves
Example 4.2.1. Consider the Mersenne prime ` = 2p − 1, let q = 2p+1. We
know from [WM71] that there exists at least one ordinary elliptic curve over Fq
with |E(Fq)| = 2`. This curve has embedding degree k = p, so Fqk = F2p(p+1).
But gcd(ord`2, p + 1) = 1, so the embedding field is F2p, and these sizes differ
by a factor of ∆ = p + 1. We note that in this case Fqk grows quadratically in
p, but the minimal embedding field grows only linearly in p.
Curves in Example 4.2.1 might be discarded since the field exponent is
not prime and thus Weil descent attacks might apply. We now show how this
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example can be generalized to work with more general exponents.
Example 4.2.2. Let ` = 2p−1 be prime, and q = 2p+s, for 1 ≤ s ≤ p+1, s 6=
p. Then we know from [WM71] that for each s there exists at least one ordinary
elliptic curve over Fq with |E(Fq)| = 2s`. We emphasize that this allows for
the extension degree to be prime. These curves have embedding degree k = p,
so Fqk = F2p(p+s). But gcd(ord`2, p + s) = 1, so the minimal embedding field is
F2p, and these sizes differ by a factor of ∆ = p + s.
4.2.2 Hyperelliptic curves
Example 4.2.3. We can consider the Mersenne prime ` = 2p − 1 for genus
two curves, which will be more thoroughly presented in Section 4.2.4. We note
that these examples have an absolutely simple Jacobian, so these curves are
not merely the product of an elliptic curve from Example 4.2.2 and another
elliptic curve. For each d2p
3
e ≤ m ≤ p − 1, we show in Proposition 4.2.7
that there exists a genus 2 curve C over F2m with #JC(F2m) = 22m−p`. Each
curve is given by the characteristic polynomial of Frobenius with coefficients
(a1, a2) = (−1, 2m − 22m−p). These curves have embedding degree k = p, so
Fqk = F2pm, but the minimal embedding field is F2p, since gcd(ord`2, m) = 1.
We have also checked the accuracy of k as a security parameter in curve
examples in the published literature, and the following is a proposed system
in [GMV04] which is subject to this discrepancy.
Example 4.2.4. [from published literature] The authors of [GMV04] propose
a family of curves of genus two over Fq where q(`) = `2 for any prime (power)
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`. The associated Jacobian defined over Fq has size n(`) = `4± `3 + `2± `+ 1.
A prime N dividing n(`) clearly divides q5 − 1, but cannot divide qk − 1 for
k < 5 except in the absurdly small case of N = 5. So every curve of this form
has embedding degree k = 5, as shown in [GMV04, Section 7.3]. However, if
n(`) = `4 + `3 + `2 + ` + 1, then N divides `5 − 1 = q5/2 − 1, so in fact the
minimal embedding field cannot be larger than Fq5/2. This makes a dramatic
difference in how large ` has to be chosen for the curves to remain secure
against pairing-based attacks. However no such security warning is present in
[GMV04].
As we have mentioned, whenever working over Fq, for q a prime, there
is no discrepancy between the computational and security-related notions of
embedding degree, but when q is a prime power there may be a significant
difference. The techniques given in [GMV04] mentioned in our Example 4.2.4
are presented in general for prime powers q, although most of the curve exam-
ples they list are over a prime field, and hence escape the discrepancy. One
should be cautious when using these techniques to generate curves, as certain
parameters within a family may yield a prime power q, and hence the curves
could be insecure.
We now give two numerical examples taken from the family of curves
given in Chapter 3. Though these curves are not used in practice, they serve
to illustrate the phenomenon we are examining.
Example 4.2.5. Consider the genus 2 curve C over F2267 given by the char-
acteristic polynomial of Frobenius with coefficients (a1, a2) = (−1, 2267 + 2178).
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the embedding degree is k = 8. Since log2 ` = 351 and k log2 q = 2136, we have
a 351-bit DLP on the curve, and a 2136-bit DLP in F∗
qk
, which is considered
hard. However, since ord`2 = mgk
′ = 712, then in the minimal embedding
field we have only a 712-bit DLP, which is considered easy.
Example 4.2.6. Consider the genus 2 curve C over F2136 given by the char-
acteristic polynomial of Frobenius with coefficients (a1, a2) = (−1, 2136 + 2124).




the embedding degree is k = 37. Since k log2 q = 5032, we have a 5032-bit
DLP in F∗
qk
, which is considered hard. However, since ord`2 = 296, then in
the minimal embedding field we have only a 296-bit DLP, which is considered
easy.
4.2.3 Family of curves revisited
We revisit the family of curves presented in Chapter 3, and now we not only
consider the embedding degree k, but also the security parameter k′. Table
4.1 gives the examples of our curves with the sizes (in bits) of the field Fqk and
the prime-order subgroup, along with mgk′, thus providing a more accurate
security comparison between the DLP on the curve and in the finite field.
We recall that the difficulty of solving a DLP in a subgroup of prime
160-bit order on a hyperelliptic curve is roughly equivalent to solving a DLP
in a finite field of around 1024-bits. As security increases, one has the respec-
tive correspondence of the DLP on the curve and in the finite field as being
approximately 256-bits to 3072-bits and 512-bits to 15360-bits [GPS06, Table
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2]. We present the numerical data in Table 4.1, recognizing that for some of
these examples, the DLP on the curve is easy, so the difficulty of the DLP in
the finite field is irrelevant.
k L r m a1 a2 log2 Nr,L k log2 q mgk
′
8 37 2 111 -1 2111 + 274 143 888 296
8 89 2 267 -1 2267 + 2178 351 2136 712
8 149 2 447 -1 2447 + 2298 591 3576 1192
13 13 3 80 -1 280 + 256 95 1040 208
16 13 3 91 -1 291 + 278 95 1456 208
23 23 2 64 -1 264 + 236 87 1472 184
23 23 2 72 -1 272 + 252 87 1656 184
23 23 2 80 -1 280 + 268 87 1840 184
26 13 3 72 -1 272 + 240 95 1872 208
26 13 3 88 -1 288 + 272 95 2288 208
37 37 2 104 -1 2104 + 260 143 3848 296
37 37 2 112 -1 2112 + 276 143 4144 296
37 37 2 120 -1 2120 + 292 143 4440 296
37 37 2 128 -1 2128 + 2108 143 4736 296
37 37 2 136 -1 2136 + 2124 143 5032 296
46 23 2 68 -1 268 + 244 87 3128 184
46 23 2 76 -1 276 + 260 87 3496 184
46 23 2 84 -1 284 + 276 87 3864 184
52 13 3 76 -1 276 + 248 95 3952 208
52 13 3 88 -1 288 + 264 95 4368 208
52 13 3 92 -1 292 + 280 95 4784 208
Table 4.1: Examples of families of genus 2 curves over F2m with appropriate
parameters for comparison of security.
4.2.4 Mersenne prime family of curves
We now return to Example 4.2.3 and prove the existence of the family of curves
of genus two over Fq whose group of Fq-rational points of its Jacobian has size
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divisible by a Mersenne prime `. This family is such that there is a difference
of a factor of m between the extension degrees of the minimal embedding field
and the one suggested by the embedding degree k.
Proposition 4.2.7. Let q = 2m, and p ≥ 7 be a prime. If ` = 2p−1 is prime,
then for each integer m such that d2p
3
e ≤ m ≤ p− 1, there exists a genus two
curve C over F2m with the property that #JC(F2m) = 22m−p`, where a1 = −1
and a2 = 2
m − 22m−p. The embedding degree is k = p and so the difference in
size between the extension degrees of Fqk and the minimal embedding field F2p
is m.
Proof. We first note that for p ≥ 7, we have m ≥ 5. Let us show that the
conditions of Theorem 3.2.1 are met for the existence of genus two curves C





q − 2q ≤ a2 ≤ 1/4 + 2q, that is,
2m/2+1 − 2m+1 ≤ 2m − 22m−p ≤ 1/4 + 2m+1.
Clearly the second inequality holds. The first inequality holds if
2m/2+1 + 22m−p = 2m(21−m/2 + 2m−p) ≤ 2m3.
Since 0 < 21−m/2 < 1, then this holds if m − p ≤ 1. Our restriction that
d2p
3
e ≤ m ≤ p− 1 implies m− p ≤ −1, so we see this condition holds true.
Now let us show that 2dm/2e divides a2.
2dm/2e | 2m − 22m−p ⇐⇒ 2m− p ≥ dm/2e
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⇐⇒ b3m/2c ≥ p
⇐⇒ m ≥ d2p
3
e.
Thus the condition holds.
Now let us show ∆ = a21 − 4a2 + 8q is not a square in Z. For contra-
diction, suppose ∆ = 1 − 2m+2 + 22m−p+2 + 2m+3 = 1 + 22m−p+2 + 2m+2 = x2
for some integer x. Since ∆ is odd, then x is odd, so let x = 2c + 1 for some
integer c. Then ∆ is a square if and only if 22m−p(2p−m + 1) = c(c + 1). We
apply Lemma 3.2.2, letting a = 2m − p and b = p −m. We note that a > 0




c ≥ p, so 2m− p > 0. Also b > 0 since p− 1 ≥ m
implies p−m > 0. Thus ∆ a square implies 2m− p ≤ p−m, that is, m ≤ 2p
3
.




e. Therefore ∆ is not
a square in Z for d2p
3
e ≤ m ≤ p− 1.
Now let us show δ = (a2 + 2q)
2 − 4qa21 is not a square in Z2. That is,
for δ = 2xb, we must show that either b 6≡ 1 mod 8 or x ≡ 1 mod 2. Now
δ = (2m − 22m−p + 2m+1)2 − 2m+2
= (2m − 22m−p)2 + 2m+2(2m − 22m−p) + 22m+2 − 2m+2
= 22m+3 + 22m − 23m−p+2 − 23m−p+1 + 24m−2p − 2m+2
= 2m+2(2m+1 + 2m−2 − 22m−p − 22m−p−1 + 23m−2p−2 − 1).
So we have that b = 2m−2(23 + 1)− 22m−p−1(2 + 1) + 23m−2p−2 − 1.
For m ≥ 5, we have
b ≡ −22m−p−13 + 23m−2p−2 − 1 mod 8
≡ 23m−2p−2(1− 2p−m+13)− 1 mod 8.
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Now, suppose b ≡ 1 mod 8. Then
b + 1 ≡ 23m−2p−2(1− 2p−m+13) ≡ 2 mod 8.
By the same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 3.2.3, 3m−2p−2 cannot
equal 0 or 2, and clearly cannot be greater than or equal to 3. If 3m−2p−2 = 1,
then m = 3+2p
3
. But p is prime and p 6= 3, so m = 3+2p
3
6∈ Z. This cannot
happen as we require an integer m. Thus b 6≡ 1 mod 8, and so δ is not a square
in Z2. Therefore the conditions of Theorem 3.2.1 are satisfied for the existence
of a genus two curve C over Fq.
Now let us show that #JC(F2m) = 22m−p` whenever a1 = −1 and
a2 = 2
m − 22m−p. We recall that #JC(Fq) = q2 + a1aa2 + a1 + 1. So
#JC(F2m) = 22m − 22m−p = 22m−p(2p − 1)
= 22m−p`.
Now we find the embedding degree k with respect to ` = 2p−1. We see
that ord`2 = p, so gcd(ord`2, m) = 1 since m ≤ p − 1. Therefore by Lemma
3.1.2, k = p, and the difference in extension degrees between Fqk and the
minimal embedding field is m
gcd(ord`2,m)




Future Research and Conclusion
5.1 Constructing explicit curves
A systematic way of determining the explicit coefficients of a curve over Fq
when given the (a1, a2) parameters that distinguish the Fq-isogeny class of its
Jacobian is not yet established. Complex multiplication (CM) methods, in-
spired by the CM algorithm proposed in [AM93], have been used for construct-
ing elliptic curves in special cases [MNT01, CP01, BLS02, DEM05, BW05,
Wen03]. The construction of hyperelliptic curves of genus two has begun to re-
ceive attention, as [Wen03] considered such curves over prime fields, [GHK+05]
gave a p-adic CM-method for ordinary curves over prime fields and [EL04] gave
a Chinese remainder theorem (CRT) algorithm for ordinary curves of genus
two.
These methods focus on supersingular and ordinary curves, and the
published literature lacks a discussion of similar approaches for p-rank 1 curves
(and occasionally excludes curves over binary fields). We imagine attention
has been drawn to ordinary curves because of their nice canonical lift property,
but we would like to explore such lifting methods for p-rank 1 curves. Then
we hope to apply these methods to construct the family of 2-rank 1 curves
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described in Chapter 3, so that one can construct such curves of cryptographic
size.
Meanwhile, we have tried to determine restrictions on the coefficients
of the curve that correspond to the power of two that divides #JC(Fq). This
technique could aid in the construction of curves, as well as be insightful for
point compression.
5.2 Point compression
In [Kin04], an algorithm for point compression is proposed when the order of
an elliptic curve over F2m is divisible by a power of two. In our family of curves
in Chapter 3, since #JC(F2m) is divisible by a high power of two, these curves
may lend themselves to point compression using similar methods.
5.3 Similar families for ordinary curves
We would like to examine ordinary curves using similar techniques that led to
the family of 2-rank 1 curves described in Chapter 3. Following this, we would
examine if there are curves in such a family that could be constructed using
known CM-methods.
5.4 Conclusion
Hyperelliptic curves are receiving increased attention for use in discrete loga-
rithm based cryptosystems. A primary focus involves the search for pairing-
friendly curves, which have an embedding degree k small enough for computa-
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tions to be feasible, but large enough for the discrete logarithm problem both
on the curve and in the minimal embedding field to be intractable. We have
constructed a sequence of Fq-isogeny classes for a family of Jacobians of genus
two, 2-rank 1 curves over Fq, for q = 2m, and their corresponding small embed-
ding degrees. In particular, we gave examples of the parameters for such curves
with embedding degree k < (log q)2, such as k = 8, 13, 16, 23, 26, 37, 46, 52, so
that the computations in Fqk may be feasible. Our family of curves also yields
the ratio ρ often near 1 and never more than 2.
We have presented examples of elliptic curves and curves of genus two
that demonstrate how the embedding degree k can fail to capture the security
of a pairing-based cryptosystem. The difference in field sizes between Fqk and
the minimal embedding field can be seen any time q = pm for m > 1 and
gcd(ord`p, m) 6= m, and we emphasize that it is possible for the extension
degrees to differ by a factor of m. It is of critical importance to check when
working over fields of small characteristic. The possible substantial difference
in the size of the fields has the implication in theory that there could be curves
used in DL systems that are presently regarded as secure against pairing-based
attacks but are in fact insecure.
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